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ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, we have seen a dramatic improvement
in the efficiency of conflict-driven clause-learning Boolean satisfia-
bility (CDCL SAT) solvers on industrial problems from a variety of
domains. The availability of such powerful general-purpose search
tools as SAT solvers has led many researchers to propose SAT-
based methods for cryptanalysis, including techniques for finding
collisions in hash functions and breaking symmetric encryption
schemes. Most of the previously proposed SAT-based cryptanalysis
approaches are blackbox techniques, in the sense that the crypt-
analysis problem is encoded as a SAT instance and then a CDCL
SAT solver is invoked to solve the said instance. A weakness of this
approach is that the encoding thus generated may be too large for
any modern solver to solve efficiently. Perhaps a more important
weakness of this approach is that the solver is in no way specialized
or tuned to solve the given instance. To address these issues, we pro-
pose an approach called CDCL(Crypto) (inspired by the CDCL(T )
paradigm in Satisfiability Modulo Theory solvers) to tailor the in-
ternal subroutines of the CDCL SAT solver with domain-specific
knowledge about cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we extend
the propagation and conflict analysis subroutines of CDCL solvers
with specialized codes that have knowledge about the cryptographic
primitive being analyzed by the solver. We demonstrate the power
of this approach in the differential path and algebraic fault analysis
of hash functions. Our initial results are very encouraging and re-
inforce the notion that this approach is a significant improvement
over blackbox SAT-based cryptanalysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers are well-known as powerful
general purpose search tools, that have been used in solving prob-
lems from many different domains, such as verification, AI and
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cryptography [8], [34], [23]. They get their power from reasoning
components like clause learning [19] and many different search
heuristics, like VSIDS or machine-learning based LRB branching
[25], [18] clause deletion [2] and restarts [3].
SAT-based Cryptanalysis. The availability of such powerful
search tool has led many researchers to propose the use of SAT
and SMT solvers for cryptanalysis of hash functions and symmetric
encryption schemes, for example in preimage attacks [24], [30],
collision attacks [23], [33] and linear and differential cryptanalysis
of block ciphers[1], [16].
Although in some of the approaches, the heuristics of the solver
are altered to improve their efficiency, e.g. branching heuristics [33],
[35] and restart policy [28], most of these approaches used a direct
encoding of the said problems into a satisfiability problem and used
SAT solvers as a blackbox, and the changes are limited to the search
heuristics and do not alter the logic reasoning components of the
solver. The one notable exception is the CryptoMiniSat solver [36],
that adds reasoning over XOR clauses to the solver to improve the
solving of cryptographic instances that heavily use XOR operations.
The current work on SAT-based cryptanalysis is similar to the
eager approach in solving Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) for-
mulas, where the formula is directly translated into a SAT instance
and then a SAT solver is invoked on it. The benefit of this approach
is that we can use any SAT solver as-is and leverage the perfor-
mance of the solver and its improvement capacity over time. The
downside of this approach is the loss of the high level semantics of
the underlying theories. This means that the SAT solver needs to
perform extra computations to prove facts that are readily available
in the higher level logic (e.g. x +y = y +x in the integer arithmetic).
The other main approach of solving SMT instances, called lazy
approach, integrates the CDCL style search with theory-specific
solvers (T -solvers). This architecture is referred to as CDCL(T ).
Generally speaking, a T -solver is useful only if it participates in
propagation and conflict analysis reasoning engines of the SAT
solver they extend.
Our Contributions. The main research question that we pose
in this paper is:
Q: Are there methods that can surpass blackbox SAT-based cryptanal-
ysis in terms of scalability and ability to break complex real-world
cryptographic primitives?
1. Inspired by the CDCL(T ) paradigm, we propose a framework
for SAT-based cryptanalysis that we call CDCL(Crypto). It extends
the propagation and conflict analysis of the core SAT solver using
the higher level knowledge about the cryptographic problem that
is being analyzed. To be more flexible, and to have simpler imple-
mentation and be able to customize the extended functionalities
to different cryptographic problems, we use the Programmatic SAT
[15] architecture, where the solver provides callbacks for extending
propagation and conflict analysis to be implemented by the user.
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2. We first review an application of this framework that has
been successfully applied to algebraic fault analysis of SHA-1 and
SHA-256 cryptographic hash functions [27], enabling the attacker
to recover the secret bits with only 11 faults in SHA-1 and 48 faults
in SHA-256, which is a significant improvement over previous
algebraic fault attacks.
3. Then we demonstrate that this framework can be applied to
other cryptographic problems, more specifically differential crypt-
analysis of round reduced SHA-256. We present preliminary results
on increasing the number of rounds in the collision finding of SHA-
256 compared to the previous SAT-based differential cryptanalysis
of SHA-256.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We refer the reader to the Handbook of Satisfiability [5] for a de-
tailed discussion on SAT and SMT solvers.
2.1 Algebraic Fault Attack
Fault attack is an invasive attack on the implementation of a cryp-
tographic primitive that has an embedded message or secret key.
The attacker expresses the set of cryptographic relations in an al-
gebraic setting with the correct output value. Then the attacker
runs the function again but this time induces faults during the
process of the function. This fault changes the value of a targeted
register and causes the function to output a faulty value. The at-
tacker then expresses the same set of relations but with the faulty
output. These additional equations will constrain the size of pos-
sible values for the secret bits. The fault injecting process can be
performed multiple times to obtain a more constrained equation
set but at the cost of formula size and solver effort. The fault
is usually injected in the input of a round close to the output,
to study the propagation of information through a small num-
ber of rounds. The equation set for a function f = f1o f2 will be
y = f1(f2(x)) ∧y′1 = f1(δ1 ⊕ f2(x)) ∧y′2 = f1(δ2 ⊕ f2(x)), where y′i s
are faulty outputs and δi s are random fault values that are unknown
to the attacker. This equation set is then handed over to a SAT/SMT
solver to find the secret bits. The equation set corresponding to
the rounds from the beginning of the function to the point of fault
injection (equations for f2(x)), are the same among correct and
faulty outputs and provide the same value to the second part of
the equations. Therefore it is a common practice to remove these
equations altogether and focus on the fault injected part of the
function. But because this is an abstraction of the full function, the
found solution needs to be verified against the full version.
2.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Broadly speaking, differential cryptanalysis [6] is the analysis of
how a difference in the input values of a cryptographic function
can affect the resultant difference at the output. Block ciphers and
cryptographic hash functions are typically comprised of chaining
of smaller functions. In these cases, differential cryptanalysis looks
at the trace of differences of values through the chain of transforma-
tions to find non-random behaviors of the function and exploiting
it to find input messages or secret keys.
Usually XOR difference is considered (∆x = x ⊕ x ′). We are
interested in relations between ∆x and ∆y = f (x ⊕ ∆x) ⊕ f (x), for
a cryptographic function f . Describing and analyzing the differen-
tial (∆x → ∆y) over f itself is usually impractical. Therefore the
differentials over the smaller steps of f are analyzed and chained
together to derive differentials over input/outputs of f . The combi-
nation of this chain of differentials over smaller operations is called
a differential path or trace. To express the set of possible combina-
tions of a pair of bits x and x ′, the generalized conditions [10] are
commonly used. It allows us to describe and encode the propagation
of information through a differential path. This notation is listed in
table 1.
Table 1: Notation for all generalized conditions. Each char-
acter represents the set of possible values for a pair of bits.
(xi ,x ′i ) ? - x 0 u n 1 # 3 5 7 A B C D E
(0, 0) + + + + + + + +
(1, 0) + + + + + + + +
(0, 1) + + + + + + + +
(1, 1) + + + + + + + +
3 CDCL(CRYPTO) FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the CDCL(Crypto) framework, based
on a programmatic SAT solver, illustrated in Figure 1.
3.1 Programmatic Interface in SAT Solvers
We call a SAT solver programmatic [15] if it is augmented with a
set of callback functions that allow the user to add functionality
to the solver’s propagation and conflict analysis routines. The idea
is inspired by the CDCL(T ) architecture, in which a theory solver
provides support for theory propagation and theory conflict analy-
sis to the base Boolean CDCL solver. Programmatic SAT solving
differs from the general concept in 3 ways: First, the theory solver
in the context of programmatic SAT can be an arbitrary piece of
code, in that we place no requirements on its completeness; second,
this code might be particularized to every input to the solver. That
is, unlike the T -solver in CDCL(T ) which remains invariant for all
formulas from the language of T , the code added via the program-
matic interface in a programmatic SAT solver can be specific and
unique to each input; and finally, the interface of programmatic
SAT solvers is much simpler than that of SMT solvers.
The main advantage of using programmatic SAT is that it allows
easy customization of the SAT solver to specific Boolean instances
rather than an entire theory. The developer thus has more fine-
grained control over the power of the SAT solver. This architecture
has also shown to be useful in solving problems in combinatorics [7],
and much more effective than only using a normal CNF encoding.
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of a CDCL SAT solver and the
connection of programmatic components (shaded blocks) to the
main components.
Programmatic propagation has the role of providing clauses
similar to theory propagation clauses. As can be seen in the fig-
ure, there is a close interaction loop between unit propagation and
programmatic propagation, in which when the unit propagation
is done, if there is no conflict, programmatic propagation analyzes
the partial assignment and determines whether any other literal
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Figure 1: Block Diagram of a CDCL SAT solver with the Programmatic components that implement cryptographic related
reasoning (shaded blocks).
is implied according to the logic of the cryptographic function. If
any literal is implied but missed by the unit propagation, an appro-
priate reason clause is returned to empower the unit propagation.
Consider that α is a subset of literals in the partial assignment that
implies another literal L, and this implication is missed by unit
propagation. The added reason clause will be simply α → L (in
CNF format). Then the unit propagation is invoked to set those
literals and possibly find more implications that are caused by the
new literals. Added reason clauses can be reused when the solver
unassigns some of the variables and assigns them again (due to
backjump or restart).
Programmatic conflict analysis, in a similar fashion, is in-
voked when the propagation is done (the combination of unit and
programmatic) and no conflict is detected. It analyzes the partial
assignment to check if there is conflicting information according
to the domain knowledge. The user can return single or multiple
conflict clauses if a conflict is detected. The core solver then looks
at the variables that are in the conflict clause, and by examining the
implication graph that has been built during the run of the solver,
attempts to find a minimized root cause of the conflict.
We have implemented this framework on top of MapleSAT [18].
Programmatic routines need to know the mapping of the high level
variables to the Boolean variable IDs. This is necessary to be able to
verify the value of a predicate when the corresponding Boolean vari-
ables are set. To keep the variable ID mapping intact, we switched
off the variable elimination procedure that MapleSAT performs as
a preprocessing step to simplify the formula. During the search, the
size of the conflict clause database only increases and this might
negatively impact the performance of unit propagation. To handle
this challenge, modern SAT solvers regularly delete some of the
lower quality clauses. In the programmatic SAT, the same problem
could happen for the reason clause database. In our implementation,
we use the same clause deletion strategy of MapleSAT to prevent
the overgrowth of reason clause database.
3.2 Cryptographic Reasoning in Programmatic
Callbacks
Even for cryptographic functions that use very simple operations,
like addition-rotation-xor (ARX) block ciphers and hash functions,
some high level properties like commutativity of addition, is lost
when translated into the Boolean level, let alone much more com-
plex cryptographic properties. One can specifically encode these
properties, but it will result in a very large SAT instance (e.g. com-
mutativity of multi-operand additions in ARX). The programmatic
approach enables us to express those properties concisely using a
piece of code (C++ in our case), that are being used by the SAT solver
through the programmatic interfaces. We will give more detailed
use of these interfaces in two cryptanalysis applications. In section
4.1, we review an algebraic fault attack on SHA hash functions
[27] and present preliminary results on differential cryptanalysis
of SHA-256 in section 4.2.
4 CASE STUDIES
4.1 Algebraic Fault Attack
In this section, we review our enhancement of algebraic fault attack
that has been applied to SHA-1 and SHA-256 using a programmatic
SAT solver [27] that enables us to solve AFA instances with much
fewer number of injected faults. The solution verification loop
is embedded in the programmatic conflict analysis. It has been
observed in this work that when using the best performing encoding
of the SHA function into SAT, if all of the input bits are set, although
all the necessary information to derive output bits are available,
unit propagation can not propagate the input values to output
bits. On the other hand, when using an encoding that ensures the
propagation of information to the output, the size of encoding
becomes so large that the solver can not solve the instance in the
given time limit. Therefore they proposed the use of programmatic
propagation to keep the size of instance small and enhance the
propagation. The programmatic components used in this work are
CASCON’19, November 4–6, 2019, Toronto, Ontario Nejati and Ganesh
briefly described as follows and their performance result is plotted
in figure 2.
Programmatic Conflict Analysis: We are only interested in
the values of variables that correspond to the secret message bits,
which are a very small subset of all of the variables needed to
encode the algebraic fault equation system into CNF. Whenever we
solve the instance and find the message bits, we should check if it
is a legitimate solution (hashes to the same correct hash output).
Normally one could wait for the solver to finish solving the whole
equation set and then check for the correctness, but we can do this
verification as soon as the variables corresponding to the message
bits are set. The sooner we reject a spurious solution, the faster the
search process becomes. When the programmatic conflict analysis
is invoked, first it recovers the original input message bits. If all
message bit variables are set, it hashes the input message bits and
checks it against the correct hash output. In case of mismatch, a
conflict clause that blocks the current spurious message bits will be
returned to the solver. The core does analysis using an implication
graph on the returned conflict clauses and then goes through the
backjumping procedure, as in the typical conflict analysis.
Programmatic Propagation: It is mentioned in [32] and [11]
that encoding of a pseudo-Boolean constraint into CNF using adder
networks, although providing a small and scalable instance, when
running unit propagation over a partial assignment, might not find
all of the implied literals that are implied in the original pseudo-
Boolean constraint (or in the constraint satisfaction notation: does
not maintain generalized arc-consistency). In SHA functions, we
have multi-operand additions in each round. There are several en-
codings for these operations in the literature. Nossum’s encoding
[30] gives a very compact CNF, which works very well in practice.
But does not maintain the arc consistency. The programmatic prop-
agation is called in the main search loop of the solver after unit
propagation is done, and no conflicts are detected. The callback
looks at the least significant bits of the operands in each of the
multi-operand additions. If all bits up to some bit position k are
set, it checks if the k least significant bits of the output are set as
well. If they are not set, it returns clauses that encode the direct
implication between input bits and output bit in the missing output
bit positions. For an example of encoding implications, if x = T ,
y = F is an assignment to the inputs of z = x + y relation, and z
is not set, we return x = T ∧ y = F → z = T or ¬x ∨ y ∨ z. These
implications force the solver to set the output bits in the next cycle.
This ensures a directional (from input to output) consistency.
4.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
A naive way of encoding an algebraic collision attack is to have
two copies of a function f that have constraints for having the
same output and different inputs (f (x) = f (y) ∧x , y). To improve
upon this encoding, we can add a set of difference variables for all
of the input, output and intermediate variables in the two copies,
where each difference variable is the XOR of the two corresponding
variables in the two copies. These difference variables are building
the differential path. Just having the differential path does not make
the problem easier, but by selecting a sparse differential path that is
highly probable, the allowed combinations for variables in the two
copies will reduce drastically. Note that for any operation, when
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Figure 2: The cactus plot comparing MapleSAT with the
MapleSAT after adding each of the programmatic callbacks
on 32-bit fault attack on SHA-256 [27]. Each data point (X ,Y )
on this plot means X fault instances are solved under Y sec-
onds. Further down means solving faster and further right
means solving more instances.
we have - (no difference) in the input variables, we will have - at
the output variables as well, i.e. running a function on the same
input twice results in the same output. A sparse differential path
means that most of the difference variables are forced to be -, and
there should be few “difference”s (x), to ensure different inputs and
keep the possible combinations throughout the differential path
limited. We put “unknown” (?) in the places that the effect of having
difference in earlier steps can potentially be canceled (to be found
by the solver). The common approach on differential cryptanalysis
of hash functions is to find a differential path first (starting from a
sparse path, find the values for ?s), then use these constraints to
find a conforming pair of messages that go through the two copies
of the function that we had. There may be no pairs of messages
that follow the path. In that case, we have to go back to the path
and modify it. An important step in this process is the propagation
of information throughout the differential path. In other words,
having difference in the input of smaller operations, what is the
possible set of combinations at the output of those operations (out-
put difference). The implication from input differentials to output
differentials is referred to as propagation rules.
Mendel et al. [22] developed a dedicated tool for differential
cryptanalysis of SHA-256. Prokop [33] took their work and encoded
their differential tables into SAT and studied the performance of
different SAT solvers on them. Prokop shows collisions on SHA-256
up to 24 rounds, which is not matching the performance of Mendel’s
solver that gives a collision up to 31 rounds in the same attackmodel.
Prokop is using bitwise XOR differences for encoding the difference
possibilities. This means that he is using only ? (unassigned), - and
x values for a difference variable. The advantage of this approach is
that each difference variable can be encoded with a single Boolean
variable. But the disadvantage is that the propagation of information
is less concrete in many cases. That is because a condition of for
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example A can not be expressed and thus it needs to fall back to the
under-specified condition of ?. To address this problem one can use
multiple Boolean variables to encode each of the difference variables
to cover all the possible information that is being propagated. The
advantage of this approach is having more concrete possibilities
and a more constrained set of values for pairs of message bits,
but the disadvantage is that the instance becomes very large in
terms of variables and clauses and the gain of having differential
path constraints will be overshadowed by the complexity of the
encoding. This is an opportunity for a programmatic component
to implement the multi-valued logic of generalized conditions for
difference variables while keeping the encoding of differential path
simple. For example when using single Boolean variables, we can
derive 2 propagation rules for the Boolean function IF(x ,y, z) =
(x∧y)∨(¬x∧z), that are “---→ -” and “-xx→ x”, and for the rest
of input difference combinations, we can not imply any differential
information for the output. But considering a multi-valued logic, we
can have very fine-grained rules that rule out certain combinations
for the pairs of bits at the output. Enumerating all of them gives us
1846 rules, which is expensive to encode in CNF.
In our implementation of programmatic propagation, simply
put, we provide a truth table for each operation, that given input
differences, determines and enforces the output difference if it is
not ?. Programmatic conflict analysis checks if the implied set of
combinations of a difference variable does not have an intersection
with a currently decided/deduced combination set. In other words,
it looks whether after applying a propagation rule the difference
variable becomes #.
We took the differential path starting points from Prokop [33],
but used our own encoding to translate the SHA-256 relations
and differential path information into SAT1. For encoding multi-
operand addition we used Nossum’s encoding [30]. We ran Maple-
SAT (with and without the programmatic components) on these
instances with a 24-hour time limit on Intel Core i7 CPU @ 3.4GHz
and 16 GB of RAM. In table 2, MapleSAT(Crypto) refers to the
version of MapleSAT that we instrumented with programmatic
callbacks. As timings show, not only we can increase the number
of rounds from 24 to 25, but also we can solve the instances of 25
rounds roughly 2.3 times faster when we use the programmatic
interface.
Table 2: CPU times (in seconds) for SAT-based differential
cryptanalysis (finding collisions) in 25 rounds of SHA-256.
Solver Encoding Runtime (s)
MapleSAT Prokop[33] 29771.80
MapleSAT Our encoding 21926.60
MapleSAT(Crypto) Our encoding 12532.32
5 RELATEDWORK
Early works on the use of SAT solvers for cryptanalysis like finding
cryptographic keys [20], modular root finding [13], or collision
attack on MD5 [23], only used direct encoding of their problem
to employ the power of SAT solvers. Subsequent works studied
1The encoder is available at: https://github.com/saeednj/SAT-encoding
different ways of encoding the same problems into SAT to find
formulas that are easier for a SAT solver in practice. Nossum [30]
and Morawiecki et al. [24] presented instance generators for preim-
age attack on SHA-1 and SHA-3. To make the SAT-based attacks
more powerful, De et al. [9] made use of Dobbertin’s attack. They
encoded the additional constraint alongside the main function to
improve the base preimage attack on MD4. These types of cryptan-
alytic techniques can be encoded inside cryptographic reasoning
components of the CDCL(Crypto) to keep the size of instance small,
but still have the benefit of reducing the size of search space.
The problem of finding the highest probable linear/differential
trail has been studied for lightweight ciphers like Simon [16] and
Speck [1]. In these works, the task of finding the optimal trail is
defined as an optimization problem, and at each step, an SMT solver
(in particular STP [14]) is queried with a trail and a parameter. If
the solver returns SAT the parameter is increased and the process
is repeated until the optimal value is reached.
Not all of the SAT-based cryptanalysis works have been com-
pletely blackbox. There were limited attempts to change the heuris-
tics of the solver to improve the runtime. For example, Semenov
et al. [35] changed the default activities and decay factor of VSIDS
branching heuristics of Minisat and got better results. Although it
should be mentioned that one can see this approach as configuring
the parameters of the solver and not changing the algorithm. Prokop
[33] changed the branching heuristic of Lingeling to focus on the
differential variables first in differential cryptanalysis of SHA-256.
Furthermore, he studied value selection heuristics. For improving
runtime of preimage attack on SHA-1 instances, an adaptive restart
policy [28] and a splitting heuristics for divide-and-conquer parallel
SAT solvers [29] has been proposed.
Notable SAT-based tools that have been developed specifically
for cryptanalysis (at least initially), include CryptLogVer [24] and
Transalg [31] which are tools for encoding cryptographic functions
into SAT, CryptoMiniSat [36] which includes XOR reasoning, and
CryptoSAT [17] and CryptoSMT [37] that provide higher level
languages for expressing cryptographic relations. For solving the
algebraic equation set of the cryptosystem, SAT and SMT solvers
are usually used. But other types of solvers have also been shown
beneficial. Mouha et al. [26] use Mixed Integer Linear Programming
solvers to find security boundaries in block ciphers.
Other than using off-the-shelf solvers, researchers have devel-
oped dedicated solvers to attack cryptographic primitives. Mostly
these dedicated tools are based on guess-and-determine approach
[4], which is a method in algebraic cryptanalysis. In this method,
we pick one variable with unknown value, guess a probable value
for it, and then propagate the guessed information through the
algebraic equation set that represents the cryptographic function,
and in case of conflicting information, undo the guesses until the
conflict is resolved. This is very similar to the process that a CDCL
SAT solver follows (decision followed by unit propagation, and
backtracking), but can be implemented specific to the function and
not necessarily be in Boolean level. Mendel et al. [21] developed a
tool for differential cryptanalysis of SHA-256. They used random
branching, problem specific propagation and backtracking. They
improved their results by improving the search strategy, better local
collisions and extra constraints [22]. Eichlseder et al. [12] took it
further and improved the tool for SHA-512, by studying different
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branching heuristics. Although this tool is dedicated to this partic-
ular problem, it borrows many ideas from SAT solving. However, it
is missing one of the most powerful components of a CDCL solver,
which is conflict analysis. CDCL(Crypto) has the potential to imple-
ment the higher level logic on the propagation of information, and
at the same time, use the underlying conflict analysis of the core
CDCL solver on the Boolean level representation of the relations.
6 CONCLUSION
We presented a framework for SAT-based cryptanalysis inspired by
the CDCL(T ) paradigm. CDCL(Crypto) consists of a core Boolean
SAT solver that is instrumented with programmatic callbacks for
propagation and conflict analysis. These callbacks will contain
user-provided cryptographic reasoning, similar to a T -solver in
CDCL(T ). This framework helps to have the higher level seman-
tics of the cryptographic primitive available while keeping the size
of the encoded function into SAT small and practical for the core
SAT solver. CDCL(Crypto) enables the researchers to implement
their cryptanalytic techniques on top of a powerful search engine.
This framework has been applied to algebraic fault analysis of SHA
cryptographic hash functions and resulted in a much more effective
search that requires far fewer number of injected faults. Also, a work
in progress on the application of this framework on differential
cryptanalysis has been demonstrated in this paper, which improves
the number of rounds and the runtime of finding a collision for
a round-reduced version of SHA-256 with 25 rounds. Symmetric
cryptographic function designers usually test their designs against
known attacks and cryptanalysis techniques. Automating these
techniques helps with speeding up the design cycle. We believe
that this framework has a great potential for improving the black-
box SAT-based cryptanalysis and therefore a valuable step toward
automating cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives.
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